Cascaded Structure Tensor Framework for Robust Identification of Heavily
  Occluded Baggage Items from X-ray Scans by Hassan, Taimur et al.
1Cascaded Structure Tensor Framework for Robust
Identification of Heavily Occluded Baggage Items
from X-ray Scans
Taimur Hassan*, Samet Akc¸ay, Mohammed Bennamoun, Senior Member, IEEE, Salman Khan,
and Naoufel Werghi, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In the last two decades, baggage scanning has
globally become one of the prime aviation security concerns.
Manual screening of the baggage items is tedious, error-prone,
and compromise privacy. Hence, many researchers have de-
veloped X-ray imagery-based autonomous systems to address
these shortcomings. This paper presents a cascaded structure
tensor framework that can automatically extract and recognize
suspicious items in heavily occluded and cluttered baggage.
The proposed framework is unique, as it intelligently extracts
each object by iteratively picking contour-based transitional
information from different orientations and uses only a single
feed-forward convolutional neural network for the recognition.
The proposed framework has been rigorously evaluated using a
total of 1,067,381 X-ray scans from publicly available GDXray
and SIXray datasets where it outperformed the state-of-the-art
solutions by achieving the mean average precision score of 0.9343
on GDXray and 0.9595 on SIXray for recognizing the highly
cluttered and overlapping suspicious items. Furthermore, the
proposed framework computationally achieves 4.76% superior
run-time performance as compared to the existing solutions based
on publicly available object detectors.
Index Terms—Aviation Security, Baggage Screening, Convolu-
tional Neural Networks, Image Analysis, Structure Tensor, X-ray
Radiographs.
I. INTRODUCTION
X -RAY imaging is a widely adopted tool for the bag-gage inspection at airports, malls and cargo transmission
trucks [1]. Baggage threats have become a prime concern all
over the world. According to a recent report, approximately
1.5 million passengers are searched every day in the United
States against weapons and other dangerous items [2]. Manual
screening process is resource-intensive and requires constant
attention of human experts during monitoring. This introduces
an additional risk of human-error caused by fatigued work-
schedule, difficulty in catching contraband items, require-
ment of quick decision making, or simply due to a less
experienced operator. Therefore, aviation authorities, all over
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Figure 1: Exemplar X-ray images showing heavily occluded and
cluttered items. Top row shows scans from SIXray dataset [3] while
bottom row shows scans from GDXray dataset [4].
the world, are actively looking for automated and reliable
baggage screening systems to increase the inspection speed
and support operator alertness. Automated inspection is also
desirable for privacy concerns. A number of large-scale natural
image datasets for object detection are publicly available,
enabling the development of popular object detectors like
R-CNN [5], SPP-Net [6], YOLO [7] and RetinaNet [8]. In
contrast, only a few datasets for X-ray images are currently
available for researchers to develop robust computer-aided
screening systems. Also, the nature of radiographs is quite
different than natural photographs. Although they can reveal
the information invisible in the normal photographs (due to
radiations), they lack texture (especially the grayscale X-ray
scans), due to which conventional detection methods do not
work well on them [9]. In general, screening objects and
anomalies from baggage X-ray (grayscale or colored) scans
is a challenging task, especially when the objects are closely
packed to each other, leading to heavy occlusion. In addition to
this, baggage screening systems face a severe class imbalance
problem due to the low suspicious to normal items ratio.
Therefore, it is highly challenging to develop an unbiased
decision support system which can effectively screen baggage
items because of the high contribution of the normal items
within the training images. Figure 1 shows some of the X-
ray baggage scans where the suspicious items such as guns
and knives are highlighted in a heavily occluded and cluttered
environment.
II. RELATED WORK
Several methods for detecting suspicious objects in X-ray
imagery have been proposed in the literature. These can be
categorized as conventional machine learning methods and
deep learning methods. We provide a representative list of the
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2main approaches, and we refer the reader to the work of [10]
for an exhaustive survey.
A. Traditional Approaches
Many researchers have used traditional machine learning (ML)
methods to recognize baggage items from the X-ray scans.
Bastan et al. [11] proposed a structured learning framework
that encompasses dual-energy levels for the computation of
low textured key-points to detect laptops, handguns and glass
bottles from multi-view X-ray imaging. They also presented
a framework that utilizes Harris, SIRF, SURF and FAST
descriptors to extract key-points which are then passed to a
bag of words (BoW) model for the classification and retrieval
of X-ray images [12]. They concluded that although BoW
produces promising results on regular images, it does not
perform well on low textured X-ray images [12]. Jaccard et
al. [13] proposed an automated method for detecting cars
from the X-ray cargo transmission images based upon their
intensity, structural and symmetrical properties using a random
forest classifier. Turcsany et al. [14] proposed a framework
that uses the SURF descriptor to extract distinct features and
passes them to a BoW for object recognition in baggage X-
ray images. Riffo et al. [15] proposed an adapted implicit
shape model (AISM) that first generates a category-specific
codebook for different parts of targeted objects along with
their spatial occurrences (from training images) using SIFT
descriptor and agglomerative clustering. Then, based upon
voting space and matched codebook entries, the framework
detects the target object from the candidate test image.
B. Deep Learning Based Suspicious Items Detection
Recently, many researchers have presented work employing
deep learning architectures for the detection and classification
of suspicious baggage items from X-ray imagery. These stud-
ies are either focused on the usage of supervised classification
models or unsupervised adversarial learning:
1) Unsupervised Anomaly Detection: Akc¸ay et al. proposed
GANomaly [16] and Skip-GANomaly [17] architectures to
detect different anomalies from X-ray scans. These approaches
employ an encoder-decoder for deriving a latent space repre-
sentation used by discriminator network to classify anomalies.
Both architectures are trained on normal distributions while
they are tested on normal and abnormal distributions from
CIFAR-10, Full Firearm vs Operational Benign (FFOB) and
the local in-house datasets (GANomaly is also verified on
MNIST dataset).
2) Supervised Approaches: Akc¸ay et al. [18] proposed
using a pre-trained GoogleNet model [19] for object classi-
fication from X-ray baggage scans. They prepared their in-
house dataset and tested their proposed framework to detect
cameras, laptops, guns, gun components and knives (mainly,
ceramic knives). A subsequent work [20] compared different
frameworks for the object classification from X-ray imagery.
They concluded that AlexNet [21] as a feature extractor with
support vector machines (SVM) performs better than other ML
methods. For occluded data, they compared the performance of
sliding window-based CNN (SW-CNN), Faster R-CNN [22],
region-based fully convolutional networks (R-FCN) [23], and
YOLOv2 [24] for object recognition. They used their local
datasets as well as non-publicly available FFOB and Full Parts
Operation Benign (FPOB) datasets in their experimentations.
Likewise, Dhiraj et al. [25] used YOLOv2 [24], Tiny YOLO
[24] and Faster R-CNN [22] to extract guns, shuriken, razor
blades and knives from baggage X-ray scans of the GRIMA
X-ray database (GDXray [4]) where they achieved an accuracy
of up to 98.4%. Furthermore, they reported the computational
time of 0.16 seconds to process a single image. Gaus et al.
[26] proposed a dual CNN based framework in which the first
CNN model detects the object of interest while the second
classifies it as benign or malignant. For object detection, the
authors evaluated Faster R-CNN [22], Mask R-CNN [27] and
RetinaNet [8] using ResNet18 [28], ResNet50 [28], ResNet101
[28], SqueezeNet [29] and VGG-16 [30] as a backbone.
Recently, Miao et al. [3] provided one of the most extensive
and challenging X-ray imagery dataset (named as SIXray) for
detecting suspicious items. This dataset contains 1,059,321
scans with heavily occluded and cluttered objects out of
which 8,929 scans contain suspicious items. Furthermore, the
dataset anticipates the class imbalance problem in real-world
scenarios by providing different subsets in which positive
and negative samples ratios are varied [3]. The authors have
also developed a deep class-balanced hierarchical refinement
(CHR) framework that iteratively infers the image content
through reverse connections and uses a custom class-balanced
loss function to accurately recognize the contraband items in
the highly imbalanced SIXray dataset. They also evaluated
the CHR framework on the ILSVRC2012 large scale image
classification dataset. After the release of the SIXray dataset,
Gaus et al. [31] evaluated Faster R-CNN [22], Mask R-CNN
[27], and RetinaNet [8] on it, as well as on other non-publicly
available datasets.
To the best of our knowledge, all the methods proposed so far
were either tested on a single dataset, or on datasets containing
a similar type of X-ray imagery. Furthermore, there are limited
frameworks which are applied to the complex radiographs
for the detection of heavily occluded and cluttered baggage
items. Many latest frameworks that can detect multiple ob-
jects and potential anomalies use CNN models (and object
detectors) as a black-box, where the raw images are passed
to the network for object detection. Considering the real-
world scenarios where most of the baggage items are heavily
occluded that even human experts can miss them, it will not
be straightforward for these frameworks to produce optimal
results. As reported in [3], for a deep network to estimate
the correct class, the feature kernels should be distinct. This
condition is hard to fulfil for occluded objects obtained through
raw images (without any initial processing), making thus the
prediction of the correct class quite a challenge [3]. In [31],
different CNN based object detectors were evaluated on the
SIXray10 subset to only detect guns and knives. Despite the
progress accomplished by the above works, the challenge of
correctly recognizing heavily occluded and cluttered items in
SIXray dataset scans is still to be addressed.
3Figure 2: Block diagram of the proposed framework. The input scan is first preprocessed (A). Afterwards, the proposal for each baggage item
is automatically extracted through the CST framework (B). The extracted proposals are then passed to the pre-trained model for recognition
(C).
III. CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we present a cascaded structure tensor (CST)
framework for the detection and classification of suspicious
items. The proposed framework is unique as it only uses a
single feed-forward CNN model for object recognition, and
instead of passing raw images or removing unwanted regions,
it intelligently extracts each object proposal by iteratively pick-
ing the contour-based transitional information from different
orientations within the input scan. The proposed framework
is robust to occlusion and can easily detect heavily cluttered
objects as it will be evidenced in the results section. The main
contributions of this paper and the features of the proposed
framework are summarized below:
• We present a novel object recognition framework that can
extract suspicious baggage items from X-ray scans and
recognizes them using just a single feed-forward CNN
model.
• The proposed framework is immunized to the class imbal-
ance problem since it is trained directly on the balanced set
of normal and suspicious items proposals rather than on the
set of scans containing an imbalanced ratio of normal and
suspicious items.
• The extraction of items proposals is performed through a
novel CST framework, which analyzes the object transitions
and coherency within a series of tensors generated from the
candidate X-ray scan.
• The proposed CST framework exhibits high robustness to
occlusion, scan type, noisy artefacts and to highly cluttered
scenarios.
• The proposed framework achieves mean intersection-over-
union (IoU ) score of 0.9644 and 0.9689, area under the
curve (AUC) score of 0.9878 and 0.9950, and a mean
average precision (µAP ) score of 0.9343 and 0.9595 for
detecting normal and suspicious items from GDXray and
SIXray dataset, respectively (see Section VI).
• The proposed framework achieves 4.76% better run-time
performance, compared to existing state-of-the-art solutions
such as [26], [18], [20], [31], [25] and [32] which are based
on exhaustive searches and anchor box estimations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section IV
describes the proposed framework and its implementation,
Section V presents the experimental setup, Section VI reports
the experiments, the results, and a comparison with state-of-
the-art solutions. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
The block diagram of the proposed framework is depicted in
Figure 2. In the first step, we enhance the contrast of the input
image via an adaptive histogram equalization [33]. Afterwards,
we generate a series of tensors where each tensor embodies
information about the targeted objects from different orienta-
tions. We employ these tensors for the automatic extraction of
baggage items proposals from the scans. We subsequently pass
these proposals to a pre-trained network for object recognition.
Each module within the proposed framework is described next:
4Figure 3: Preprocessing stage: (A) original image ξX containing an
occluded gun, (B) enhanced image ξtX in which the gun is visible.
A. Preprocessing
The primary objective of the preprocessing stage is to en-
hance the low contrasted input. We perform contrast stretch-
ing through adaptive histogram equalization [33]. Let ξX ∈
<M×N the X-ray scan where M and N denotes the number
of rows and columns, respectively. Let ℘ be an arbitrary patch
of ξX where ℘ is obtained by dividing ξX into I × J grid of
rectangular patches. The histogram of ℘ is computed and is
locally normalized using the following relation:
~ = Γ
(
∆℘ −∆℘min
M ∗N −∆℘min (LM − 1)
)
(1)
where ∆℘ is the cumulative distribution function of ℘, ∆℘min
is the minimum value of ∆℘, LM represents the maximum
grayscale level of ξX , Γ(.) is the rounding function and ~ is
enhanced histogram for ℘. This process is repeated for all the
patches of ξX to obtain the contrast stretched version ξtX as
shown in Figure 3. We can observe that the occluded gun is
visible in the enhanced scan.
B. Cascaded Structure Tensor (CST) Framework
CST is a framework for object extraction from a candidate
scan which is based on a novel contoured structure tensor
approach. We will first report the conventional structure tensor;
then describe our more generalized approach proposed in this
context of suspicious baggage items detection.
1) Conventional 2D Discrete Structure Tensor: A 2D dis-
crete structure tensor is defined as a second moment matrix
derived from the image gradients. It reflects the predominant
orientations of the changes (contained in the gradients) within
a specified neighbourhood of any pixel in the input scan
[34], [35]. Furthermore, structure tensor can tell the degree
to which those orientations are coherent. For a pixel p in ξtX ,
the structure tensor S(p) is defined as:
S(p) =
[ ∑
r ϕ(r)(∇x(p−r))2
∑
r ϕ(r)(∇x(p−r).∇y(p−r))∑
r ϕ(r)(∇y(p−r).∇x(p−r))
∑
r ϕ(r)(∇y(p−r))2
]
(2)
where ϕ is a smoothing filter typically chosen as a Gaussian
function, ∇x and ∇y denotes the image gradients w.r.t x and
y direction, respectively. From Eq. (2), we can observe that
for each pixel in the input scan, we obtain a 2 × 2 matrix
representing the distribution of orientations within the image
gradients w.r.t its neighbourhood. In order to measure how
strongly this matrix is biased towards a particular direction,
the degree of coherency or anisotropy is computed through
the two eigenvalues from S(p) as shown below:
c =
(
λ1 − λ2
λ1 + λ2
)2
(3)
where c represents the coherence measure such that 0 ≤ c ≤ 1,
λ1 and λ2 are the two eigenvalues. In the proposed framework,
we are primarily not interested in finding out the strong
orientations within the specified neighborhood of any pixel.
Here, our purpose is to extract the coherence maps such
that they represent the maximum transitions of baggage items
from different orientations. Furthermore, in the conventional
structure tensor, the gradients are computed in two orthogonal
directions only. However, the baggage items within X-ray
scans can have other directions as well.
Figure 4: Gradient orientations for computing tensors in CST
framework.
2) Modified Structure Tensor: The modified version of the
structure tensor can reveal the objects oriented in any direction
within the candidate image. It is defined over K image
gradients associated to K number of different orientations
yielding the structure tensor matrix of K × K order where
K ∈ N as shown below:
= =

=00 =01 · · · =0K−1
=10 =11 · · · =1K−1
...
...
. . .
...
=K−10 =K−11 · · · =K−1K−1
 (4)
Each coherence map or tensor (=ij) in Eq. (4) is an outer
product of smoothing filter and the image gradients i.e.
=ij = ϕ ∗ (∇i.∇j) having M × N dimension, ∇i and ∇j
are the image gradients in the direction i and j, respectively.
Also, rather than using a Gaussian filter for smoothing, we
employ anisotropic diffusion filter [36] as it is extremely
robust in removing noisy outliers while preserving the edge
information. Moreover, it can be noted that = is a symmetric
matrix which means that =ij = =ji or in other words there are
K(K+1)
2 unique tensors in =. The gradient orientations (ϑ) in
the modified structure tensor is computed through ϑ = 2pikK
5Figure 5: Six unique tensors from = for K = 3. For each image
(in the first column), the respective tensors are arranged from left to
right according to their norm.
where k is varied from 0 to K − 1. For example, for K = 1,
we have only one tensor for one image gradient oriented at 0
rad. For K = 2, we have four tensors for two image gradients
oriented at 0 rad and pi rad. Figure 4 shows the orientation of
image gradients for different values of K. Figure 5 shows the
six unique tensors obtained for randomly selected scans when
K = 3.
3) Coherent Tensors: As mentioned above, with K ori-
entations, we obtain K(K+1)2 unique tensors. Each tensor
highlights objects in the candidate image w.r.t the predomi-
nant orientations of its respective image gradients. However,
considering all these tensors for the generation of object
contours (and proposals) is redundant, time-consuming, and
might make the proposed framework vulnerable to noise. We
instead select a reduced number of M predominant tensors,
which we dubbed the Coherent Tensors. The optimal values
of K and M will be determined empirically in the ablation
analysis (see Section VI-A).
4) Extraction of Object Proposals: After obtaining the
coherent tensors, we add them together to obtain a single
coherent representation (=Θ) of the candidate image. Then,
=Θ is binarized and morphologically enhanced to remove the
unwanted blobs and noisy artefacts. Moreover, after generating
the baggage items contours, they are labelled through con-
nected component analysis [37] and for each labelled contour,
a bounding box is generated based upon minimum bounding
rectangle technique (see Figure 6). This bounding box is
then used in the extraction of the respective object proposal
from the candidate image. Proposals generated by the CST
framework contain either a single object or overlapping objects
(see examples in Figure 7).
Object borders in an X-ray scan exhibit different level of
intensity. This disparity make objects with high transition-
level borders (e.g. shuriken in Figure 8A) have more detec-
tion likelihood compared to those showing weaker transitions
(razor blades in Figure 8A). In order to accommodate these
different levels of boundary intensity, we employ the CST in
a multi-pass scheme in which regions corresponding to the
proposals detected in the previous pass (most likely having
a high boundary transition level) are discarded from the ξtX
image, by computing the discrete Laplacian and then solving
the Dirichlet boundary value problem [38], in the subsequent
pass. In this way, the pixels in the proposals bounding boxes
of the previous pass are replaced with the intensity values
Figure 6: Bounding box generation for each occluded object: (A)
original image, (B) CST contour map, (C) contours of pistol and
the chip objects. (D) bounding box generated for pistol object, (E)
bounding box generated for the chip object, (F) bounding boxes
overlaid on the original scan for the extracted objects.
derived from the proposal boundaries (see Figure 8 E and I).
This iterative process is repeated until there are no more object
transitions left to be picked from the candidate scan as shown
in Figure 8 (K). The detailed pseudo-code of the proposed
CST framework is presented below:
Algorithm 1: Proposed CST Framework
1 Input: Enhanced Image ξtX , No. of Orientations K
2 Output: Object Proposals OρΥ
3 hasObjects ← true
4 OρΥ ← φ
5 while hasObjects is true do
6 Compute K2 tensors from ξtX
7 Generate the coherent tensor representation =Θ
8 Use =Θ to compute contour map ΦΘ
9 Compute a labeled object map `Φ from ΦΘ
10 if `Φ is φ then
11 hasObjects ← false
12 end
13 foreach label ` in `Φ do
14 Compute its bounding box βB
15 Use βB to crop proposal Oρ from ξtX
16 Add Oρ in the list of proposals OρΥ
17 Use βB to in-paint Oρ in ξtX
18 end
19 end
5) Object Recognition: After extracting the object propos-
als, these are passed to the pre-trained ResNet50 model [28] for
recognition. The ResNet50 exhibits good performance in cater-
ing the vanishing gradient problem through the residual blocks
[39]. We employ ResNet50 in fine-tuning mode, whereby we
replace the final classification layer with our custom layer for
the recognition of proposals within this application. We do not
freeze the rest of the layers so that they also get updated during
the training phase to recognize the object proposals effectively.
However, we use the original weights in the initialization phase
for faster convergence. The training set is composed of object
proposals obtained with the CST framework, which generates
around 167 proposals on average per scan. This amplification
6Figure 7: Examples of extracted proposals. The top row shows
proposals for isolated objects and bottom two rows show proposals
of the occluded, merged and cluttered objects.
Figure 8: CST framework convergence. First row shows the first
iteration, second row shows the second iteration whereas third row
shows the third and final iteration for extracting the objects from the
candidate scan.
in the number of training samples allows deriving balanced
sets for normal and suspicious items, as will be described
further in the experimental setup in Section V. In the training
set, proposals are labelled as follows: 1) Proposals containing a
single suspicious item or a portion of a single item are labelled
by that item category 2) Proposals containing overlapped
suspicious items are labelled with the item category occupying
the largest area in the bounding box. 3) Proposals that do not
contain suspicious items are labelled as normal.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The proposed framework is evaluated against state-of-the-
art methods on different publicly available datasets using a
variety of evaluation metrics. In this section, we have listed
the detailed description of all the datasets and the evaluation
metrics. This section also describes the training details of the
pre-trained CNN model.
A. Datasets
We assessed the proposed system with GDXray [4] and SIXray
[3] datasets, each of which is explained below:
1) GRIMA X-ray Database: The GRIMA X-ray Database
(GDXray) [4] was acquired with an X-ray detector (Canon
CXDI-50G) and an X-ray emitter tube (Poksom PXM-20BT).
It contains 19,407 X-ray scans arranged in welds, casting,
baggage, nature and settings categories. In this paper, we only
use the baggage scans to test the proposed framework, as this
is the only relevant category for suspicious items detection.
The baggage group has 8,150 X-ray scans containing both
occluded and non-occluded items. Apart from this, it contains
the marked ground truths for handguns, razor blades, and
shuriken. For a more in-depth evaluation, we have refined
this categorization by splitting the original handgun category
into two classes; namely, pistol and revolver. We have also
identified and annotated three new classes i.e. the knife, mobile
phone class and the chip class, which represents all the
electronic gadgets, including laptops. We adopted a training
set in accordance with standard defined in [4], i.e. 400 scans
from B0049, B0050 and B0051 series containing proposals for
revolver (handgun), shuriken and razor blades, to which we
added 388 more scans for the new categories (chip, pistol,
mobile and knives). From the 788 training scans, we have
obtained a total number of 140,264 proposals which were
divided into suspicious and normal categories. The last, is
an auxiliary class that includes proposals of miscellaneous
and unimportant items like keys and bag zippers, which
are generated by CST framework. However, we discarded
84,162 normal proposals to keep the number of suspicious
and unsuspicious items balanced. The detailed summary of
the GDXray dataset is depicted in Table I.
Table I: Detailed description of GDXray dataset.
Total Scans Dataset Split Training Proposals Items
8,150 Training: 788# Total: 140,264 Pistol**
Testing: 7,362 Normal: 28,049 Revolver**
Suspicious: 28,053 Shurken
Discarded: 84,162? Knife*
Average: 178 / scan Razor Blades
Chip*
Mobile*
* These items have been identified locally for more in-depth validation of the
proposed framework. Chip class represents all the electronic gadgets including
laptops (except mobiles).
? these are the normal proposals that have been discarded for balanced
training of the CNN model for proposals recognition.
** The original handgun category is further broken down into pistol and
revolver because both items are found to be in abundance within this dataset.
# 400 scans from B0049, B0050 and B0051 series are used for extracting
revolver, shuriken and razor blades as per the criteria defined in [4] and using
this same percentage of training and testing split, we used 388 more scans to
train the model for the extraction of other items.
2) Security Inspection X-ray Dataset: Security Inspection
X-ray (SIXray) [3] is one of the largest datasets for the
detection of heavily occluded and cluttered suspicious items. It
contains 1,059,231 color X-ray scans having 8,929 suspicious
items which are classified into six groups i.e. gun, knife,
wrench, pliers, scissor and hammer. All the images are stored
in JPEG format, and the detailed description of the dataset
is presented in Table II. To validate the performance of the
proposed framework against the class imbalance problem, the
same subsets have been utilized, as described in [3], in which
the ratio of suspicious items and normal objects have been
7matched with real-world scenarios. Also, the ratio of 4 to 1 for
training and testing has been maintained in accordance with
[3]. For the SIXray dataset, we also have added a separate
normal class to filter the proposals of miscellaneous and
unimportant items that are generated by the CST framework.
Moreover, it should also be noted from Table I and II that for
each dataset we have trained the classification model on the
balanced set of normal and suspicious items proposals where
the excessive normal items proposals are discarded to avoid
the classifier bias.
Table II: Detailed description of SIXray dataset
Subsets* Scans† Dataset Split Training Proposals
SIXray10 98,219 Training: 78,575 Total: 12,179,125
Testing: 19,644 Normal: 2,435,819
Suspicious: 2,435,825
Discarded: 7,307,481?
SIXray100 901,829 Training: 721,463 Total: 111,826,765
Testing: 180,366 Normal: 22,365,348
Suspicious: 22,365,353
Discarded: 67,096,064?
SIXray1k 1,051,302 Training: 841,042 Total: 130,361,510
Testing: 210,260 Normal: 26,072,296
Suspicious: 26,072,302
Discarded: 78,216,912?
Average: 155 / scan
* The suspicious items within the SIXray dataset are: gun, knife, wrench,
pliers, scissor and hammer.
? These are the normal proposals that have been discarded for balanced
training of the CNN model for proposals recognition.
† total scans within the SIXray dataset are 1,059,231 in which 8,929 scans are
positive (containing one or more suspicious items), and the rest of 1,050,302
scans are negative.
B. Training Details
The classification of the baggage items is performed through
pre-trained ResNet50 model after fine-tuning it on the object
proposals extracted from the scans of GDXray and SIXray
datasets.
The training process was conducted for 13 epochs having a
mini-batch size of 64 using MATLAB R2019a with deep learn-
ing toolbox, on a machine with an Intel Core i5-8400@2.8GHz
processor, 16 GB RAM and NVIDIA RTX 2080 GPU with
cuDNN 7.5. The optimization during the training phase was
performed through ADAM [40] with a base learning rate
of 0.001, whereas 20% of the training data is used for
validation which is performed after 100 consecutive iterations.
Furthermore, the categorical cross-entropy loss function (ζL)
is employed during training which is computed through Eq.
(5):
ζL = −
s∑
i=1
ω∑
j=1
yi,j log(pi,j) (5)
where s denotes the total number of samples, ω denotes total
number of classes, yi,j is a binary indicator stating whether ith
sample belongs to jth class and pi,j is the predicted probability
of the ith sample for jth class. Figure 9 shows the training
performance of the proposed framework.
C. Evaluation Criteria
The performance is evaluated based on the following metrics:
Figure 9: Training performance of the proposed framework in terms
of accuracy (A) and cross entropy loss (B). First 1300 iterations, after
which the convergence was achieved, are shown.
1) Intersection over Union: IoU describes the overlapping
area between the extracted object bounding box and the
corresponding ground truth. It is also known as the Jaccard’s
similarity index and it is computed through Eq. (6):
IoU =
Λ(βB ∩Gτ )
Λ(βB ∪Gτ ) (6)
where βB is the extracted bounding box for the baggage
item, Gτ is the ground truth and Λ(.) computes the area of
the passed region. Although IoU measures the ability of the
proposed CST framework to extract the suspicious items, it
does not measure the detection capabilities of the proposed
framework.
2) Accuracy: Accuracy describes the performance of cor-
rectly identify an object and no-object regions as described
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FN + TN + FP
(7)
where TP denotes the true positive samples, TN denotes the
true negative samples, FP denotes the false positive samples
and FN denotes the false negative samples.
3) Recall: Recall, or sensitivity is the true positive rate
(TPR) which indicates the completeness of the proposed
framework to correctly classifying the object regions.
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
(8)
4) Precision: Precision (PR) describes the purity of the
proposed framework in correctly identifying the object regions
against the ground truth.
PR =
TP
TP + FP
(9)
5) Average Precision: Average precision (λP ) represents
the area under the precision-recall (PRC) curve. It is a
measure that indicates the ability of the proposed framework
to correctly identifying positive samples (object proposals in
our case) of each class or group. λP (for each class) is
computed by sorting the images based on confidence scores
and marking the bounding box predictions positive or negative.
The prediction is marked positive if IoU ≥ 0.5 and negative
8otherwise. Afterwards, the TPR and PR, computed using Eq.
(8) and (9), are used to generate λP as follows:
λP =
∫ b
a
PˆR(r)dr ≈
(
b∑
r=a
P IR(r)∇TPR(r)
)
(10)
P IR(r) = max
rˆ≥r
PR(rˆ) (11)
where P IR denotes the estimated precision, ∇TPR represents
the change (difference) in the consecutive recall values, a is
the starting point which is equal to 0, b is the endpoint of the
interpolation interval which is 1 and PˆR represents the actual
precision curve. After computing the λP for each class, the
µAP score is computed using Eq. (12):
µAP =
1
Nc
(
Nc−1∑
k=0
λP (k)
)
(12)
where Nc denotes the number of classes in each dataset.
6) F1 Score: F1 score measures the capacity of correctly
classifying samples in a highly imbalanced scenario. It is
computed by considering both PR and TPR scores.
F1 = 2× PR × TPR
PR + TPR
(13)
7) Receiver Operator Chracteristics (ROC) Curve: ROC
curves indicate the degree of how much the proposed frame-
work confuses between different classes. It is computed with
the true positive rate TPR and the false positive rate (FPR).
FPR = 1− Specificity = 1− TN
TN + FP
=
FP
TN + FP
(14)
where specificity is the true negative rate. After computing
the ROC curves for each class within GDXray and SIXray
datasets, AUC is computed by numerically integrating the
ROC curve.
8) Qualitative Evaluations: Apart from the quantitative
evaluations, the proposed framework is thoroughly validated
through qualitative evaluations as will be shown in the results
section.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we report the results obtained through a
comprehensive series of experiments conducted with GDXray
and SIXray datasets. In Section VI-A, we report the ablative
analysis we conducted to study the effects of the number of
orientations, the number of coherent tensors, and the choice
of classification network on the overall system performance.
In Section VI-B, we present the performance of the proposed
system evaluated based on the metrics explained in Section
V-C. Then, in Section VI-C, we report a comparative study
with state-of-the-art methods. In Section VI-D, we discuss the
limitations of the proposed framework.
A. Ablation Study
The number of orientation K and the number of selected
coherent tensors M are the main hyper-parameters of the
CST framework. The number K is related to the capacity
of the CST for accommodating objects oriented in different
directions, while M is related to the most relevant tensors.
In the first experiment, we varied the number of orientations
K from 2 to 4, and we computed µAP for a number of
selected tensors M varying from 1 to K(K+1)2 . In the results,
reported in Table III, we notice an overall enhancement of the
performance as K increases. We also notice that for K = 4,
the performance reaches a peak of 0.934 and 0.959, at M = 2,
for both GDXray and SIXray, then starts to decrease. This
decay can be explained by the fact that including more tensors
adds spikes and noisy transitions leading to the generation of
noisy edges and negative miscellaneous proposals (see some
instances in Figure 10).
To have more insight on the impact of the number of orienta-
tions in terms of performance and efficiency, we computed, in
the second experiment, the µAP and the average processing
time per image, for different values of K ranging from 2 to
8 while keeping the number of selected tensors M fixed to 2.
In the results, reported in Table IV, we can notice that the
detection performance slightly increases with the number of
orientations in both datasets. However, this little enhancement
comes at the detriment of the computational time, as reflected
in the observed exponential increase rate in both datasets. For
instance, the computation time increases by a factor of two
and four, when the number of orientations passes from K = 4
to K = 5, for the GDXray and the SIXray, respectively. These
observations indicate that the volume of generated proposals
become excessively redundant after the number of orientation
goes beyond a certain threshold. Considering the figures in
Table III and Table IV, we choose K = 4 and M = 2
as the optimal values for the number of orientations and the
number of tensors, as they present the best trade-off between
the detection performance and the computational time.
Table III: Detection performance in terms of µAP by varying
number of orientations and the number of selected tensors for
the GDXray and the SIXray.
GDXray K2 3 4
M
1 0.593 0.652 0.798
2 0.671 0.774 0.934
3 0.764 0.836 0.913
4 - 0.769 0.879
5 - 0.684 0.742
6 - 0.543 0.617
7 - - 0.536
8 - - 0.361
9 - - 0.295
10 - - 0.225
SIXray K2 3 4
M
1 0.604 0.738 0.807
2 0.749 0.826 0.959
3 0.801 0.804 0.894
4 - 0.743 0.890
5 - 0.662 0.697
6 - 0.581 0.573
7 - - 0.498
8 - - 0.396
9 - - 0.216
10 - - 0.164
To analyze the performance of the CST framework across
different pre-trained models, we conducted another series
of experiments, in which we computed the µAP for sev-
eral standard classification networks. The results, depicted
in Table V, show that the best detection performance is
achieved by DenseNet201, whereas ResNet101 stood second
and ResNet50 came third. However the DenseNet201 is outper-
forming ResNet50 only by 0.722% on GDXray and 0.08% on
9Table IV: Performance in terms of µAP and detection time by
varying the number of orientations K. The number of selected
tensors M is set to 2 here. Time is shown in seconds for
processing one image on average.
K
GDXray SIXray
µAP Time (sec) µAP Time (sec)
2 0.9212 0.0051 0.9486 0.0093
3 0.9285 0.0103 0.9532 0.0165
4 0.9343 0.0174 0.9595 0.0212
5 0.9386 0.0463 0.9617 0.3879
6 0.9408 0.6540 0.9643 1.5001
7 0.9411 1.1793 0.9691 2.0791
8 0.9437 2.6213 0.9738 2.5457
Figure 10: Noisy and miscellaneous proposals.
SIXray dataset. Also, the ResNet models have better trade-offs
between memory consumptions and time performance than
DenseNets [41], due to which, we prefer the ResNets (partic-
ularly ResNet50 because of its less memory consumption) in
the proposed study.
B. System Validation
In Figure 11, we report some qualitative results for the
two datasets, showcasing how our framework can effectively
extract and localize suspicious items from the grayscale and
color X-ray scans w.r.t their ground truths.
In Figure 12, we report other qualitative results of items
exhibiting high occlusion and clutter. Through these examples,
we can appreciate the capacity of the framework for accurately
extracting and recognizing items in such challenging condi-
tions. For example, in (A, D) and (B, E), we can observe
that the chip and revolver have been detected despite being
severely occluded by the bundle of wires. Similar examples
can be also noticed for the occluded pistol, mobile, shuriken
and razor blades in (C, F), (G, J), (H, K), (I, L), (M, P), (N,
Q) and (O, R). In Q and R, in particular, we can observe how
effectively the proposed framework has identified the razor
blade despite having and intensity close to the background.
For the SIXray dataset, we can also observe how our frame-
work effectively recognizes partially and heavily occluded
suspicious items (see the pairs (S, V), (T, W), (U, X), (Y, AB),
(Z, AC), and (AA, AD)). Notice, in particular, the detected
overlapped knife in (S, V) and (T, W) and the overlapped
wrench and knife in (Y, AB) and (Z, AC). Also, these examples
reflect the effectiveness of the coherent tensor framework in
discriminating overlapped items even when there are a lot of
background edges and sharp transitions within the scan as it
can be seen in (S, V), (T, W), (U, X), (Z, AC), and (AA, AD).
Also, the ability of the proposed framework to discriminate
between revolver and pistol can be in noticed in (B, E) for the
Table V: Comparison of pre-trained models for baggage items
proposals recognition in terms of µAP . Bold indicates the
best results. Second best results are underlined while optimal
results are highlighted in blue
Model GDXray SIXray
VGG16 + CST 0.8936 0.9126
ResNet50 + CST 0.9343 0.9595
ResNet101 + CST 0.9401 0.9564
GoogleNet + CST 0.9296 0.9419
DenseNet201 + CST 0.9411 0.9603
Table VI: Mean IoU ratings on GDXray and SIXray for
extracting different suspicious items
Items GDXray SIXray
Gun 0.9487* 0.9811
Knife 0.9872 0.9981
Shuriken 0.9658 -
Chip 0.9743 -
Mobile 0.9425 -
Razor 0.9681 -
Wrench - 0.9894
Pliers - 0.9637
Scissor - 0.9458
Hammer - 0.9354
Mean ± STD 0.9644 ± 0.0165 0.9689 ± 0.0249
* the IoU score of ’Gun’ category in GDXray is an average of pistols
and revolvers.
revolver and ((C, F), (I, L)) for the pistol. Note that all the
existing state-of-the-art solutions have considered these two
items as part of the single handgun category in their methods.
Figure 11: Examples of detected objects for the GDXray and the
SIXray dataset. Red color shows the extracted regions, while cyan
color shows the ground truth. These examples showcase the extraction
accuracy of our framework.
Figure 13 reports the validation of our system through the
ROC curves. Figure 13 (left) depicts the recognition rate
related to the classification normal versus suspicious items,
for the GDXray and the SIXray datasets. We achieved here
the AUC score of 0.9863 and 0.9901, respectively. Figure 13
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Table VII: λP and µAP scores on GDXray and SIXray for
the detection of different suspicious items. ’-’ indicates that
the respective item is not present in the dataset
Items GDXray SIXray
Razor Blades 0.8826 -
Knife 0.9945 0.9347
Pistol 0.8762 -
Mobile 0.9357 -
Revolver 0.9441 -
Shuriken 0.9917 -
Chip 0.9398 -
Gun 0.9101* 0.9911
Wrench - 0.9915
Plier - 0.9267
Scissor - 0.9938
Hammer - 0.9189
Mean ± STD 0.9343 ± 0.0442 0.9595 ± 0.0362
* the λP score of ’Gun’ category in GDXray is an average of pistols and
revolvers.
(middle) and (right) show the ROC curves related to the item-
wise recognition for the GDXray and SIXray, respectively.
Here the true positives and true negatives represent pixels of
the items and pixels of the background which are correctly
identified, respectively. We note here that the reported scores
are computed based on both: the correct extraction and the
correct recognition of the suspicious items. For example, if the
item has been correctly extracted by the CST framework, but it
has been misclassified by the ResNet50, then we counted it as a
false negative in the scoring. In Figure 13 (middle), we notice
the razor blades score relatively lower than the other items
(This is also reflected in the related AUC score of 0.9582 in
Table VIII). This is explained by the fact that the intensity
differences between the razor blades and the background is
very minimum within the scans of the GDXray dataset causing
this item to be missed by the CST at some instances.
Figure 14 shows the PRC curves computed on the GDXray
and SIXray dataset, respectively. The PRC confirms further
the robustness of our framework.
In Table VII, we report the λP performance for each item
in the two datasets. On average, our system achieves a µAP
score of 0.9343 and 0.9595 on GDXray and SIXray datasets,
respectively. Note that the λP score of 0.9101 for the handgun
category in the GDXray dataset is the average of pistol and
revolver scores.
Table VIII depicts the AUC scores for the different items, with
mean scores of 0.9878 and 0.9950 obtained for the GDXray
and the SIXray dataset, respectively. As in Table VII, the AUC
score of the Gun class is the average of the pistol and the
revolver scores.
C. Comparative Study
For the GDXray dataset, we compared our framework with
the methods [15], [25], [42] and [43] as shown in Table
IX. The performance comparison is nevertheless indirect as
the experiment protocol in each study differs. We, (as well
as authors in [15]) followed the standards laid in [4] by
considering 400 images for training (100 for razor blades,
100 for shuriken and 200 for handguns. However, [15] used
600 images for testing purposes (200 for each item) and
considered only 3 items whereas we considered 7 items and
used 7,362 scans for testing. The authors in [25] considered
a total of 3,669 selective images in their work having 1,329
razor blades, 822 guns, 540 knives, and 978 shuriken. To train
Faster R-CNN, YOLOv2 and Tiny YOLO models, they picked
1,223 images from the dataset and augmented them to generate
2,446 more images. The work reported in [43] involved 18
images only while [42] reports a study that is based on non-
ML methods where the authors conducted 130 experiments to
detect razor blades within the X-ray scans.
Contrary to the aforementioned methods, we assessed our
framework for all the performance criteria described in Section
V (C). Also, it should be noted here that the proposed frame-
work has been evaluated in the most restrictive conditions as
compared to its competitors where the true positive samples
(of the extracted items) were only counted towards the scoring
when they were correctly classified by the ResNet50 model as
well. So, if the item has been correctly extracted by the CST
framework but was not correctly recognized by the ResNet50
model, we counted it as a misclassification in the evaluation.
Despite these strict requirements, we were able to achieve
2.37% improvements in terms of precision as evidenced in
Table IX.
For the SIXray dataset, we compared our system with the
methods proposed in [3] and [31] (the only two frameworks
which have been applied on the SIXray dataset to date).
Results are reported in Table X. The SIXray dataset is divided
into three subsets to address the problem of class imbal-
ance. These subsets are named as SIXray10, SIXray100 and
SIXray1000. SIXray10 contains all 8,929 positive scans (hav-
ing suspicious items) and 10 times the negative scans (which
do not contain any suspicious item). Similarly, SIXray100
has all the positive scans and 100 times the negative scans.
SIXray1000 contains only 1000 positive scans and all the
negative scans (1,050,302 in total). So, the most challenging
subset for the class imbalance problem is SIXray1000. Note
that the works [3] and [31] employed different pre-trained
models, which we also reported in Table X for completeness.
Moreover, for a direct and fair comparison with [3] and [31],
we have trained the proposed framework on each subset of
Table VIII: AUC scores on GDXray and SIXray for the
detection of different suspicious items. ’-’ indicates that the
respective item is not present in the dataset
Items GDXray SIXray
Razor Blades 0.9582 -
Knife 0.9972 0.9981
Pistol 0.9834 -
Mobile 0.9914 -
Revolver 0.9932 -
Shuriken 0.9987 -
Chip 0.9925 -
Gun 0.9883* 0.9910
Wrench - 0.9971
Plier - 0.9917
Scissor - 0.9990
Hammer - 0.9932
Mean ± STD 0.9878 ± 0.0120 0.9950 ± 0.0031
* the AUC score of ’Gun’ category in GDXray is an average of pistols
and revolvers.
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Figure 12: Examples showcasing the performance of the proposed framework in recognizing heavily occluded, cluttered and concealed items
from GDXray and the SIXray. The first, third, fifth, seventh and ninth column shows the original scans. Please zoom for better visibility.
Figure 13: From left to right: ROC curves for identifying normal and suspicious items on GDXray and SIXray dataset, ROC curve for
items recognition on GDXray and SIXray dataset, respectively.
Figure 14: From left to right: PRC curves for items recognition on
GDXray and SIXray dataset.
the SIXray dataset individually and evaluated it using the same
metrics as described in [3]. Furthermore, we have excluded the
hammer class in these experiments as it was not considered in
[3] and [31]. The scores depicted in Table X evidence the supe-
riority of our framework over its competitors in terms of object
classification and localization. In the last experiment, we
compared the computational performance of our system with
standard one-staged (such as YOLOv3 [44], YOLOv2 [24] and
RetinaNet [8]), and the two-staged detectors (such as Faster R-
CNN [22]), as they have been widely used for suspicious items
detection in the literature. The results, depicted in Table XI,
show that our system scores the best average time performance
in both training and testing outperforming the existing object
detectors. Note also that although YOLOv2 [24] produces
Figure 15: Failure cases on GDXray and SIXray datasets. Left
column shows the original scans while right column shows the results.
significantly improved computational performance over other
two-staged architectures, it has limited capacity for detecting
smaller objects like diapers, sunglasses, and rubber erasers
[24]. Though YOLOv3 [44] seems improving in this regard.
D. Failure Cases
We observed two types of scenarios where our framework is
a bit limited in extracting the suspicious items correctly. The
first scenario is when the CST framework cannot highlight
the transitional differences in the extremely occluded objects.
One of such cases is shown in Figure 15 (A, E), where
we can see that our framework could not identify the pistol
due to the complex grayscale nature of the scan. However,
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Table IX: Performance comparison of the proposed framework on the GDXray dataset. The first and second-best performances
are marked in bold and blue, respectively. ’-’ indicates that the metric is not computed. The protocols are defined below.
Metric Proposed FasterR-CNN [25]
YOLOv2
[25]
Tiny YOLO
[25]
AISM1
[15]
AISM2
[15]
SURF
[15]
SIFT
[15]
ISM
[15] [42] [43]
AUC 0.9870 - - - 0.9917 0.9917 0.6162 0.9211 0.9553 - -
Accuracy 0.9683 0.9840 0.9710 0.89 - - - - - - -
TPR 0.8856 0.98 0.88 0.82 0.9975 0.9849 0.6564 0.8840 0.9237 0.89 0.943
Specificity 0.9890 - - - 0.95 0.9650 0.63 0.83 0.885 - 0.944
FPR 0.0110 - - - 0.05 0.035 0.37 0.17 0.115 - 0.056
PR 0.9526 0.93 0.92 0.69 - - - - - 0.92 -
F1 0.9178 0.9543 0.8996 0.7494 - - - - - 0.9048 -
Proposed: Classes: 7, Split: 5% for training and 95% for testing, Training Images: 400 (and 388 more for extra items), Testing Images: 7,362.
[15]: Classes: 3, Split: 40% for training, 60% for testing, Training Images: 400, Testing Images: 600 (200 for each category).
[25]: Classes: 4, Split: 80% for training and 20% for validation, Total Images: 3,669.
[42]: Classes: 1, (non-ML approach).
[43]: Classes: 3, Total Images: 18.
* the ratings of AISM1 and AISM2 are obtained from the ROC curve of AISM for different FPR values.
Table X: Performance comparison of the proposed framework with existing solutions on the SIXray subsets. The first and
second-best performances are marked in bold and blue, respectively.
Criteria Subset ResNet50+ CST
ResNet50
[28]
ResNet50 +
CHR [3]
DenseNet
[45]
DenseNet +
CHR [3]
Inceptionv3
[46]
Inceptionv3
+ CHR [3] [31]
Mean
Average
Precision
SIXray10 0.9634 0.7685 0.7794 0.7736 0.7956 0.7956 0.7949 0.86
SIXray100 0.9318 0.5222 0.5787 0.5715 0.5992 0.5609 0.5815 -
SIXray1000 0.8903 0.3390 0.3700 0.3928 0.4836 0.3867 0.4689 -
Localization
Accuracy
SIXray10 0.8413 0.5140 0.5485 0.6246 0.6562 0.6292 0.6354 -
SIXray100 0.7921 0.3405 0.4267 0.4470 0.5031 0.4591 0.4953 -
SIXray1000 0.7516 0.2669 0.3102 0.3461 0.4387 0.3026 0.3149 -
Table XI: Time performance comparison of the proposed
framework with popular object detectors.
Frameworks Training (sec) Testing (sec)
YOLOv3 [44] 694.81 0.021
YOLOv2 [24] 712.06 0.024
RetinaNet [8] 926.97 0.071
R-CNN [5] 305,896 134.13
Faster R-CNN [22] 19,359 0.52
Proposed 679.43 0.020
identifying a pistol in such a challenging scan is an extremely
difficult task for even a human expert. Also, a gun item
was not detected in (B, F) because of the extreme clutter in
that scan. In (C, G), two instances of a knife could not be
detected. While these limitations have been rarely observed
in the experiments they can be catered by considering more
orientations to further reveal the transitional patterns. However,
doing so would increase the overall computational time of the
proposed framework.
The second scenario is related to cases of a correct proposal
generation with misclassification of their content. An instance
of these cases is depicted in Figure 15 (H) (last column),
in which the pistol object has been misclassified as knife.
However, we did notice that such instances are detected with
a relatively low score (e.g. 0.537 for that knife item). These
cases can, therefore, be catered in the second screening stage
based on their confidence score. Note that detecting suspicious
items even misclassified is a safer approach in this context.
In some instances, we also observed that our framework
sometimes does not generate tight bounding boxes for the
recognized items such as the chip in Figure 12 (Y, AB),
(Z, AC); and the razor blade in (N, Q). This limitation
emanates from our contour-based proposal identification in
the CST framework in which the bounding boxes are not
necessarily tight to the object. While bounding box regression
can address this limitation, such a mitigation approach will
incur a significant additional computational burden in return
of a marginal impact on the accuracy.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a deep learning system for the identi-
fication of heavily cluttered and occluded suspicious items
from X-ray images. In this system, we proposed an original
contour-based proposal generation using a Cascaded Structure
Tensor (CST) framework. The proposed framework is highly
sensitive in picking merged, cluttered and overlapping items at
a different level of intensity through an original iterative pro-
posal generation scheme. The system recognizes the proposals
using single feed-forward CNN architecture and does not
require any exhaustive searches and regression networks. This
property makes our system more time-efficient as compared
to the popular CNN object detectors. The proposed system is
rigorously tested on different publicly available datasets and
is thoroughly compared with existing state-of-the-art solutions
using different metrics. We achieve the mean IoU score of
0.9644 and 0.9689, AUC score of 0.9878 and 0.9950, and
a µAP score of 0.9343 and 0.9595 on GDXray and SIXray
dataset, respectively. The proposed framework outperforms
the state-of-the-art in terms of quantitative and computational
performance. The proposed system can be extended to normal
photographs and popular large scale publicly available datasets
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for the automatic object detection. This will be the object of
our future research.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is supported with a research fund from Khalifa
University: Ref: CIRA-2019-047.
REFERENCES
[1] “Cargo Screening: technological options,” Aviation Security Interna-
tional, Retrieved: December 4th, 2019.
[2] N. R. Council, “Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies
and Implementation Issues,” The National Academics Press, 1996.
[3] C. Miao, L. Xie, F. Wan, C. Su, H. Liu, J. Jiao, and Q. Ye, “SIXray: A
Large-scale Security Inspection X-ray Benchmark for Prohibited Item
Discovery in Overlapping Images,” IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2019.
[4] D. Mery, V. Riffo, U. Zscherpel, G. Mondragon, I. Lillo, I. Zuccar,
H. Lobel, and M. Carrasco, “GDXray: The Database of X-ray Images
for Nondestructive Testing,” Journal of Nondestructive Evaluation,
November 2015.
[5] R. Girshick, J. Donahue, T. Darrell, and J. Malik, “Rich feature
hierarchies for accurate object detection and semantic segmentation,”
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2014.
[6] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Spatial Pyramid Pooling in Deep
Convolutional Networks for Visual Recognition,” European Conference
on Computer Vision, 2014.
[7] J. Redmon, S. Divvala, R. Girshick, and A. Farhadi, “You Only Look
Once: Unified, Real-Time Object Detection,” IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2016.
[8] T. Y. Lin, P. Goyal, R. Girshick, K. He, and P. Dollar, “Focal Loss for
Dense Object Detection,” IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, 2017.
[9] M. Bastan, W. Byeon, and T. Breuel, “Object Recognition in Multi-View
Dual Energy X-ray Images,” British Machine Vision Conference, 2013.
[10] S. Akc¸ay and T. Breckon, “Towards Automatic Threat Detection: A
Survey of Advances of Deep Learning within X-ray Security Imaging,”
preprint arXiv:2001.01293, 2020.
[11] M. Bastan, “Multi-view object detection in dual-energy X-ray images,”
Machine Vision and Application, November 2015.
[12] M. Bastan, M. R. Yousefi, and T. M. Breuel, “Visual Words on Baggage
X-ray Images,” 14th International Conference on Computer Analysis of
Images and Patterns, August 2011.
[13] N. Jaccard, T. W. Rogers, and L. D. Griffin, “Automated detection
of cars in transmission X-ray images of freight containers,” 11th
IEEE International Conference on Advanced Video and Signal Based
Surveillance, August 26th-29th, 2014.
[14] D. Turcsany, A. Mouton, and T. P. Breckon, “Improving feature-based
object recognition for X-ray baggage security screening using primed
visual words,” IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology,
February 25th-28th, 2013.
[15] V. Riffo and D. Mery, “Automated Detection of Threat Objects Using
Adapted Implicit Shape Model,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics: Systems, June 2015.
[16] S. Akc¸ay, A. A. Abarghouei, and T. P. Breckon, “GANomaly: Semi-
Supervised Anomaly Detection via Adversarial Training,” Asian Con-
ference on Computer Vision, 2018.
[17] S. Akc¸ay, A. A. Abarghouei, and T. P. Breckon, “Skip-GANomaly:
Skip Connected and Adversarially Trained Encoder-Decoder Anomaly
Detection,” International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, July
14th-19th, 2019.
[18] S. Akc¸ay, M. E. Kundegorski, M. Devereux, and T. P. Breckon, “Transfer
learning using convolutional neural networks for object classification
within X-ray baggage security imagery,” International Conference on
Image Processing, September 2016.
[19] C. Szegedy, W. Liu, Y. Jia, P. Sermanet, A. D. Reed, Scott, D. Erhan,
V. Vanhoucke, and A. Rabinovich, “Going Deeper with Convolutions,”
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2015.
[20] S. Akc¸ay, M. E. Kundegorski, C. G. Willcocks, and T. P. Breckon,
“Using Deep Convolutional Neural Network Architectures for Object
Classification and Detection within X-ray Baggage Security Imagery,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, March 2018.
[21] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton, “ImageNet Classification
with Deep Convolutional Neural Networks,” Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, 2012.
[22] S. Ren, K. He, R. Girshick, and J. Sun, “Faster R-CNN: Towards
Real-Time Object Detection with Region Proposal Networks,” Neural
Information Processing Systems, 2015.
[23] J. Dai, Y. Li, K. He, and J. Sun, “R-FCN: Object Detection via Region-
based Fully Convolutional Networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.06409,
2016.
[24] J. Redmon and A. Farhadi, “YOLO9000: Better, Faster, Stronger,” IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2017.
[25] Dhiraj and D. KumarJain, “An evaluation of deep learning based object
detection strategies for threat object detection in baggage security
imagery,” Pattern Recognition Letters, January 2019.
[26] Y. F. A. Gaus, N. Bhowmik, S. Akc¸ay, P. M. G. Garcia, J. W. Barker,
and T. P. Breckon, “Evaluation of a Dual Convolutional Neural Network
Architecture for Object-wise Anomaly Detection in Cluttered X-ray
Security Imagery,” The International Joint Conference on Neural
Networks, July 14th-19th, 2019.
[27] K. He, G. Gkioxari, P. Dollar, and R. Girshick, “Mask R-CNN,” IEEE
International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV), 2017.
[28] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep Residual Learning for
Image Recognition,” IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, 2016.
[29] F. N. Iandola, S. Han, M. W. Moskewicz, K. Ashraf, W. J. Dally,
and K. Keutzer, “SqueezeNet: AlexNet-level accuracy with 50x fewer
parameters and <0.5MB model size,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.07360,
2016.
[30] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman, “Very Deep Convolutional Networks
for Large-Scale Image Recognition,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.1556,
2014.
[31] Y. F. A. Yona, N. Bhowmik, S. Akc¸ay, and T. P. Breckon, “Evaluating the
Transferability and Adversarial Discrimination of Convolutional Neural
Networks for Threat Object Detection and Classification within X-ray
Security Imagery,” arXiv preprint arXiv: 1911.08966v1, November 20th,
2019.
[32] T. Morris, T. Chien, and E. Goodman, “Convolutional Neural Networks
for Automatic Threat Detection in Security X-ray Images,” IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Machine Learning and Applications, December
2018.
[33] K. Zuiderveld, “Contrast Limited Adaptive Histograph Equalization,”
Graphic Gems IV, San Diego: Academic Press Professional, pp.
474–485, 1994.
[34] J. Bigun and G. Granlund, “Optimal Orientation Detection of Linear
Symmetry,” First International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV),
1987.
[35] J. Bigun, G. Granlund, and J. Wiklund, “Multidimensional Orientation
Estimation with Applications to Texture Analysis and Optical Flow,”
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 1991.
[36] P. Perona and J. Malik, “Scale-space and edge detection using
anisotropic diffusion,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and
Machine Intelligence, July 1990.
[37] S. Hanan and M. Tamminen, “Efficient component labeling of images of
arbitrary dimension represented by linear bintrees,” IEEE Transactions
on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 1988.
[38] M. Kozdron, “The Discrete Dirichlet Problem,” April 2000.
[39] S. Khan, H. Rahmani, S. A. A. Shah, M. Bennamoun, G. Medioni, and
S. Dickinson, “A Guide to Convolutional Neural Networks for Computer
Vision,” Morgan & Claypool, 2018.
[40] D. P. Kingma and J. Ba, “ADAM: A Method for Stochastic Optimiza-
tion,” International Conference for Learning Representations, 2015.
[41] G. Pleiss, D. Chen, G. Huang, T. Li, L. V. D. Maaten, and K. Q.
Weinberger, “Memory-Efficient Implementation of DenseNets,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1707.06990, 2017.
[42] V. Riffo and D. Mery, “Active X-ray Testing of Complex Objects,” 15th
World Conference on NonDestructive Testing, 38(5), 335–343, 2005.
[43] D. Mery, “Automated Detection in Complex Objects using a Tracking
Algorithm in Multiple X-ray Views,” IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshop, 2011.
[44] J. Redmon and A. Farhadi, “YOLOv3: An Incremental Improvement,”
arXiv, 2018.
[45] G. Huang, Z. Liu, V. D. M. Laurens, and K. Q. Weinberger, “Densely
Connected Convolutional Networks,” IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2017.
[46] C. Szegedy, V. Vanhoucke, S. Ioffe, J. Shlens, and Z. Wojna, “Rethinking
the Inception Architecture for Computer Vision,” IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2016.
